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Since November 2008, the Federal Reserve of the United States pursued a 
series of large-scale asset purchases, known as Quantitative Easing. In 
this Work Project, I describe the context, the objectives and the 
implementation of the Quantitative Easing. Additionally, I discuss its 
expected effects. Finally, I present empirical evidence of the effects on 
interest rates, output and inflation. I conclude that the first round of 
purchases was effective on preventing deflation and depression while the 
second had a small impact on economy.  














With interest rate policy tool constricted by the zero lower bound, the Federal 
Reserve used, since September 2008, its balance sheet as the main tool of monetary 
policy in the response to the financial crisis. Within the series of policies used to 
accommodate the negative effects of the financial crisis, the most preponderant was 
Quantitative Easing, a set of targeted asset purchases programs funded through deposits 
of reserves. 
 Here, I explain the implementation of Quantitative Easing and its objectives. On 
the second part, I discuss the expected effects of large-scale asset purchases with the 
model in Cúrdia and Woodford (2011). Finally, I discuss the empirical evidence on the 
effects of Quantitative Easing. 
 Although it is unconventional, Quantitative Easing is not a new policy tool. In 
essence, it represents an increase of bank reserves and, therefore, an increase in the 
supply of money through the open market operations. Nonetheless, the Federal 
Reserve’s Quantitative Easing differs from the previous ones on the targets of the 
purchases (Bernanke (2009)). In November 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) announced the intention to purchase $500 billion of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and $100 billion in debt of housing-related government enterprises 
(agency debt). The purchases, executed through open market operations, which 
comprehended assets that were not normally traded by the Federal Reserve, were large 
enough so that they would have/had a large impact on the mortgage related markets and 
on the credit markets in general. 
 During 2009, FOMC increased the targets of the purchases to $1.25 trillion of 
MBS, $200 billion in housing agency debt and initiated the purchase of $300 billion of 
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long-term Treasury securities. In November 2010, a second round of quantitative easing 
began with the intent of purchasing $600 of long-term Treasury securities, in response 
to slow pace economic recovery and deflationary pressures verified in the first quarters 
of 2010. Additionally, FOMC would keep reinvesting the principal payments agency 
debt and mortgage-backed securities in long-term Treasury securities. 
 The effects of purchases on interest rates, inflation and economic growth have 
been the subject of analysis of many research papers in recent years. While some 
authors such as Cochrane (2011), Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), Doh (2010) focused on 
modeling the possible effects of quantitative easing, other authors, including Chung et 
al. (2011), Gagnon et al. (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and 
Stroebel and Taylor (2009), studied the empirical evidence of the impact. 
 For the analysis of the expected effects on interest rates, aggregate demand and 
inflation, I use the New Keynesian model with credit frictions in Cúrdia and Woodford 
(2011). According to the model, when the zero lower bound is reached, the purchases of 
assets like MBS and agency debt have a positive effect on credit spreads and aggregate 
demand as opposed to Treasury purchases that have no effects.  
In the last section, I discuss the empirical evidence about the effects of 
Quantitative Easing on macroeconomic variables. Moreover, I analyze the evolution of 
interest rates of mortgages and corporate bonds during 2008-2011 to discuss the effects 
of Quantitative Easing. To examine the impact of quantitative easing on inflation, I 
apply the spread between nominal Treasury securities and Treasury Inflation Protected 
Securities (TIPS). Using the spread between 10-year and 3-month Treasury securities, I 
discuss the effect on the economic activity. 
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 I conclude that the first round of Quantitative Easing had significant effects on 
credit spreads and successfully avoided a scenario of deeper recession. On the other 
hand, the second round had relatively small effects, where most of them resulted from 
the signaling given to market participants about FOMC’s desire to keep short-term 
interest rates low for a long time. 
 
II. Quantitative Easing 
 
Since the summer of 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to 
accommodate the negative effects of subprime mortgage crisis by continuously 
lowering short-term interest rates. In less than a year, the committee reduced the federal 
funds target rate in 325 basis points, which, according to Bernanke (2009), seemed not 
to be sufficient to offset the negative impact on economy of credit restriction. In 
December 2008, FOMC fixed the target rate at 0-25 basis points. At this level, the 
federal funds rate reached the zero lower bound, since Federal Reserve is not allowed to 
pay negative interest rates on federal funds. (Data from Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.) 
As the federal funds rate cannot decrease beyond the zero lower bound, the 
FOMC could no longer use an interest rate, given by the federal funds rate, as its main 
instrument of monetary policy. For this reason, the FOMC decided to use its balance 
sheet as an instrument of monetary policy. In order to reduce the interest rates and 
increase the lending in private credit markets, especially in the mortgage credit markets, 




 Starting on November 2008, the purchases comprehended both debt and 
mortgage-backed securities issued by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. Because MBS are bonds representing an investment 
over a pool of real estate loans that are used as instrument to increase mortgage lending, 
their purchase along with the purchase of debt of housing agencies would provide a 
stimulus to credit and housing markets. 
All the purchases were funded by deposits of reserves in financial institutions’ 
accounts at Federal Reserve and executed through open market operations, conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed). The assets purchased and 
sold are held in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) which serves as collateral 
for the liabilities on the Federal Reserve System’s balance sheet. With the beginning of 
Quantitative Easing, the volume of holding assets and bank reserves on Fed’s balance 
sheet expanded to considerable levels. By the end of March 2010, when the purchases 
of MBS and agency debt ended, the Federal Reserve had around $1.4 trillion more in 
assets and $1.1 trillion more in total reserves at its balance sheet. (Figures 1 and 2) 
Traditionally, open market operations included almost exclusively Treasury 
securities and were designed to have minimal effects on the assets involved. In contrast, 
asset purchases programs under Quantitative Easing were designed to have a large 
impact on interest rates and prices of the assets acquired, as well as other assets with 
similar characteristics.  
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, because of the complexity 
of the assets involved and dimension of the program, the purchases of MBS required the 
expertise of external investment managers that had responsibility of provide advisory 
services and execute the purchases on behalf of Federal Reserve on a daily-basis. 
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These purchases of MBS were done in the secondary market and directly with 
Federal Reserve’s primary dealers. To avoid buying overpriced securities, the Federal 
Reserve measured the changes in liquidity of each class of mortgage-backed securities 
and adjusted the pace of purchases to it. The liquidity was measured according to 
different criteria that included relative price valuations, trading volumes and indications 
of supply imbalances (Gagnon et al. (2010)). 
By the end of its purchases, the Federal Reserve held two thirds of total 
outstanding MBS with 4 and 4.5 percent coupon rates, the most issued coupon classes 
while first round of Quantitative Easing took place (Sack (2009)). Because the newly-
issued MBS result from the new mortgages, the purchases of MBS focused on these 
classes so the credit availability for new mortgage loans would increase. 
Due to the smaller dimension of the program and the less complex nature of the 
assets involved, the agency debt purchases did not required external expertise and were 
conducted by New York Fed staff alone. To execute the transactions, the Federal 
Reserve organized multi-price reverse auctions on a weekly basis. Initially, the 
purchases of agency debt focused on less liquid securities, but to promote the market 
functioning and mitigate market dislocations, the scope expanded to more liquid 
securities such as the newly-issued. Because the purchases were proportional to the 
amount of agency debt available in the market, the securities with 2-5 years maturity 
that had larger outstanding supply, were the most purchased (Gagnon et al. (2010)). 
On March 2009, the Committee decided to increase the volume of purchases of 
mortgage-backed securities to $1.25 trillion, to increase the purchases of agency debt to 
$200 trillion and to start the purchase of $300 billion of long-term Treasury securities. 
The Treasury securities purchase program had the duration of six months and the 
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purchases were conducted at rhythm of one to two per week. The transactions followed 
the same process as the agency debt, through multi-price auctions with primary dealers 
as counterparties. (Figure 3) 
As the purchases successfully reduce interest rates on mortgages, the refinancing 
activity increased, leading to an acceleration of repayments of principals on MBS held 
in SOMA. As a result, the volume of long-term securities held by private investors 
increased and the long-term interest rates were higher. To stop the rise of long-term 
interest rates, FOMC decided, on August 2010, to maintain the size of SOMA holdings. 
To accomplish this, the revenue from the payments of principals on MBS held in 
SOMA was used in additional purchases of long-term Treasury securities. 
On November 2010, concerned with economic outlook, the FOMC announced 
the second round of quantitative easing with the intent to foster the economic recovery 
and to ensure stable price levels consistent with the FOMC mandate. To accomplish 
this, the Committee directed the New York Fed to purchase $600 billion of long-term 
Treasury securities, in the following eight months at a pace of $75 billion per months. In 
addition, the New York Fed had instructions to keep the reinvestment of principal 
payments from SOMA holdings in the acquisition of long-term Treasury debt. By the 
end of program, June 30, 2011, the Open Market Trading desk had executed $767 








III. Expected effects of quantitative easing 
 
Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) use a New Keynesian model with an extension to 
include credit frictions. The economy has three sectors: households, financial 
intermediaries and a central bank.  
 Financial intermediaries play a role in this model because of the heterogeneity in 
spending opportunities across households and the lack of expertise to borrow and lend 
funds among themselves. There are two types of households: the borrowers, more 
impatient to consume, borrow funds in equilibrium; the savers, more patient to 
consume, save in equilibrium. The marginal disutility from working differs so that the 
two types of households work the same hours in equilibrium. The difference between 
impatience to consume leads to the necessity of reallocation of funds between the two 
types, therefore, financial intermediation matters. 
 The intermediary sector is comprised of perfectly competitive firms. The 
intermediaries take deposits that are perfect substitutes of riskless government debt as 
investment for saving households and pay the same nominal return   
  one period later. 
Then, they can choose to make one-period loans    which demand the payment of   
  
and the quantity of reserves    to hold at central bank that pay the nominal interest of 
  
 .  
There are two types of borrowers: the good that will repay the loans one period 
later and; the bad that will not repay their loans. The intermediaries cannot distinguish 
between the two types, only can know the fraction of bad loans   (  ). Moreover, they 
incur at operational costs, therefore, they consume real resources   
 (     ) in the 
period when loans are originated. The resources consumed increase with the size of 
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operations    and decrease with the real supply of reserves        ⁄ . For any level 
of credit  , there is a satiation level  ̅ ( ), the lowest value of   for which 
   
 (     )   . 
To finance the costs of intermediation and the loans that are not repaid, financial 
intermediaries are forced to charge higher nominal interest rates on loans than they pay 
on deposits. The objective function of intermediaries is given by 
( )                                                 (  )    
 (     ) 
The deposits that are not used to finance loans and reserve acquisition are considered 
earnings. They maximize their earnings by choosing    and   . The two first order 
conditions are 
( )                                          
 (     )     (  )     
  
    
 
    
  
( )                                               
 (     )    
  
  
    
 
    
  
 
In the first equation, the credit spread    is always positive (  
    
  for all t) 
and a function   (     ) of real supply of reserves and aggregate volume of private 
credit. On the second equation, the differential   
  between interest rates on deposits 
and on reserves depends on the same two aggregate quantities.  
 Moreover, the market-clearing condition requires that supply of credit 
correspond to the demand of credit 
( )                                                                       
    
where the supply includes both lending from private intermediaries    and lending to 
private sector by central bank   
  . Central bank can choose between lending   
   and 
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holding government debt, both paying nominal interest of   
 , restrained by the real 
reserve supplying  .  
(5)                                                             
     .  
When it lends to private sector, central bank has a cost function    (  
  ) which 
is increasing and     ( )   . In equilibrium, it charges the same nominal interest   
  of 
private intermediary loans, thus making   
  the only rate that it is able to choose.  
However, the central bank is able to influence   
  in two different ways: if the 
central bank chooses to vary the reserve supply   , it forces the differential   
  to 
change; and if chooses to vary   
 ,   
  will be different for any given   
    Thus, central 
bank can control both   
  and   
  separately as long as      
    
 , for any period t. 
This imposition comes from the resource cost function    (  
  ) and the impossibility 
to pay negative interest rate on reserves.  
 So, in this model, the central bank has three different dimensions of policy: 
interest-rate policy, by choosing the target for   
   reserve supply policy, when chooses 
the nominal amount of reserves    and; credit policy, by choosing the amount of 
lending to private sector   
    
 Now we can define the aggregate variables of economy. First, the aggregate 
demand    as 
( )                                             ∑  
 
  (  
    )         
where    
 (  
    )  represents the weighted expenditure demands of function of 
household with type   *   +, which depends on marginal utility of income   and 
shocks on preferences,    the exogenous public spending and    the amount of 
resources consumed by financial intermediaries (including Central Bank).  
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 Inflation is determined by 
( )                                                            (  )    
          (     
    
    )    , (    )- 
Here, inflation is determined not only by the aggregate demand, marginal utility gap, 
     
   
 ⁄   and the external shocks   , but also by expected future aggregate outputs 
and future marginal utility gaps. 
 The social welfare is given by 
( )                                                  (               )  
where    is a function of aggregate demand   , marginal-utility gap   , cost of financial 
intermediation     index of price dispersion    and, external shocks on preferences, 
technology and public spending. There is an interior maximum for welfare as function 
of aggregate demand due to its impact on marginal utilities of consumption and work. 
Welfare is monotonically decreasing with   , the measure of inefficiency on credit 
allocation, with   , the resources consumed on financial intermediation and   , the 
measure of inefficiency in price dispersion of composite good. 
 
How quantitative easing could be effective 
 
According to this model, Quantitative Easing corresponds to an expansion of the 
reserve supply   . Then, the central bank can use the funds obtained to concede credit 
    to the borrowing households, which would correspond to what Federal Reserve 
when it bought MBS and agency debt. Alternatively, the central bank can choose to buy 
riskless government debt, which is the case of second round of quantitative easing. 
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If we take (2), we can confirm that there is an optimal level of reserve supply for 
each    so the differential   
     
 (     )   . Thus, the optimal policy for reserve 
supply is the one that  
( )                                                           
  
  
  ̅ ( )            
Any increase in    until satiation level will produce a reduction of private 
intermediaries cost, therefore having an impact on welfare through, both the marginal-
utility ratio   and aggregate intermediaries cost  . Given that all demand for reserves is 
satisfy and   
     there is no benefit from any increase in bank reserves through the 
reduction of the intermediation costs   . 
However quantitative easing can improve welfare in two other ways: if it 
corresponds to a change the expected path of future policy rate   
  or if is used to finance 
lending to private sector   
  . Due to the “New Keynesian Phillips curve” in (7), if 
Central Bank commits to keep policy rate   
  for a longer time, even after the economic 
recovery, today’s expectation about future inflation will be higher and so, deflation can 
be prevented like output depression can be prevented. This result is similar to the ones 
present in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Werning (2011). 
In this model, the focus is on the case where central bank uses the increase in 
reserves to finance the lending to the private sector. This can be considered to be the 
case when the Federal Reserve purchased MBS and agency debt that could be viewed as 
an indirect way of Fed to lend to household and business due to the nature of these 
assets. 
In order to explain how, in this model, an increase in lending by central bank 
through quantitative easing could contribute to stabilize the economy after the financial 
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crisis, we have to assess how effective it would be compared to an interest rate policy. 
Assuming that the Central Bank follows a interest rate policy specified by 
(  )                                         
     { ̅          ̂   }  
where          is the inflation rate,  ̂      (   ̅⁄ ) and  ̅
  is the steady-state real 
policy rate. And that the credit policy follows the rule 
(  )                                                      
     (    ̅)  
where  ̅ is the level of lending from private intermediaries at steady-state, and     
  is the degree of response of central bank lending to shocks in private lending. If 
      the central bank follows the policy of “Treasuries only”, where it only uses 
reserves to finance purchases of riskless Treasury securities and cannot lend to private 
sector anytime. If    , the central bank will completely offset the variation in lending 
from private intermediaries so aggregate credit will be at steady state level  ̅   ̅.  
 The higher the degree of response of central bank lending, the less damaging 
will be the effects of a financial disturbance that cause an increase in credit spread 
 ̅ ( ̅). The more credit  
   concedes, the less will fall the aggregate lending, the 
aggregate demand and the welfare. Moreover, the central bank will not have to reduce 
the policy rate so much. 
 In the case of no costs associated to central bank lending, the optimal degree of 
response would be    , but because central bank consumes resources when lends to 
the households, there is an optimal choice of    . Considering    (   ) increases at 
least weakly convex and     ( )     so there is always a positive marginal cost from 
lending, the optimal choice of     is given by 
(  )     [ ̅ 
  (    
  )      (  
  )]      [ ̅ 
   (    
  )    
  (    
  )]      
(  )                                                     
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where      and      are shadow values and, the first term and second terms are the 
partial derivatives, with respect to   
   and holding the value of total borrowing constant, 
of    and   , respectively.  
If the cost of central bank is sufficiently large, “Treasuries only” will be the 
optimal policy in a steady state and in cases where disturbances cause small increases 
on credit spread. A optimal credit policy involving   
     will occur in the case of 
large financial disturbances that increase the marginal cost of private intermediation 
 ̅  . The most favorable case to an active credit policy is the one where the spread 
increases due to a shock in  ̅ 
  
 and  ̅ 
   
. Figure 4 shows the comparison between the 
“Treasuries only” and the optimal credit policy, in that case. There, the optimal credit 
policy keeps the overall lending and aggregate demand constant while in its absence 
they fall sharply. 
Considering that interest rate policy was restrained by the zero lower bound 
since December 2008, the credit policy conducted by FOMC through the purchases of 
MBS and agency would, according to this model, contribute to an improvement in 
welfare. Rather than being part of a simple reserve expansion, the purchases of private 
debt would consist in an increase of central bank lending that would offset the impact of 
the decrease in the aggregate private lending and, therefore, avoid a rise in credit 
spreads and a decrease in aggregate demand. 
On the other hand, the purchase of Treasury securities would correspond to a 
“Treasuries only” policy. Although it might be considered the optimal credit policy 
since the financial disturbances that anticipated FOMC decisions on March 2009 and on 
November 2010 were smaller than when FOMC decided to initiate Quantitative Easing 
on November 2008, the result would be null. Since the beginning of 2009, the interest 
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rate paid on excess reserves was almost zero like the ones paid on federal funds and on 
3-month Treasury bills, which would mean       and, therefore,   
 =0. Any 
expansion of reserves that would have no effects on credit spreads   or aggregate 
lending  . 
Under this model, the FOMC will still be able to meet its inflation targets in the 
future even after the expansion of bank reserves because the interest rates and the 
balance sheet belong to two independent dimensions of central bank’s monetary policy, 
a large amount of excess reserves is consistent with high short-term interest rates. 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Quantitative Easing 
 
A. Previous Studies 
 
Here, I do a survey of empirical evidence on the effects of Quantitative Easing 
based on economic literature about the subject. 
Gagnon et al. (2010) present an event study about the effects on interest rates. 
The results were fairly positive: not only the interest rates on Treasuries, agency debt 
and MBS declined notably but also the yields on Baa corporate bonds and swap rates 
fell, indicating widespread effects of purchases. Additionally, when comparing event to 
non-event days came to conclusion that the purchases contributed to relaxation of 
financial strains and to reverse the flight-to-quality flows. 
Other authors, such as D’Amico and King (2010), Doh (2010) and Hamilton and 
Wu (2011), focused their research on the effects of the purchases of Treasury securities. 
Doh (2010) analyzed the impact of the March’s 2009 announcement on 10-year 
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Treasury yields and concluded, like Gagnon et al. (2010), that the purchases of 
Treasuries contributed to the reduction of the term premium on 10-year Treasury bonds.  
Hamilton and Wu (2011) found statistically significant forecasting relations between the 
structure of Treasury debt held by the public and argued that a policy of large-scale 
Treasury purchases had the potential to reduce the overall interest rates level of an 
economy at zero lower bound. D’Amico and King (2010) found that the purchases had a 
greater effect on similar and less liquid assets and that even anticipated, they had 
significant effects. 
More recently, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) used an event 
study of communications similar to Gagnon et al. (2010) and regression to discuss the 
effects of both rounds through different channels on yields of different assets and 
inflation expectations.  
 According to it, the first round of quantitative easing reduced the inflation 
uncertainty and avoided deflation by increasing 10-year expected inflation up to 146 
basis points. More notably, the increase in Treasury supply during 2009 had large 
impact on safety premium when the demand for safety was around 2.5 times the 
demand prior to the crisis and a smaller impact during the second round as the demand 
decrease to normal levels. This is consistent to the mechanism in Cochrane (2011) 
where the supply of public debt was no longer effective when the demand for safe assets 
was stable. One of the most relevant findings is that the efficacy of the second round of 
quantitative easing depended largely on the signaling channel and, specifically, on the 
announcement of Fed’s intention to keep the fed funds rate close to zero until mid-2013, 
which makes the success of second round to depend more on the communication than 
the purchases themselves.  
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B. Observed Effects 
 
Here, I discuss the impact of Quantitative Easing on interest rates, inflation 
expectations and economic growth. To do that, I use data from the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. First, I focus on the evolution of the interest rates of 
mortgages and corporate bonds (Figure 5) and on the evolution of the yields of Treasury 
securities of different maturities (Figure 6). Then, I analyze the effects of large-scale 
asset purchases on inflation expectations (Figure 7) and on economic activity (Figure 8). 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of interest rates on corporate bonds and mortgages. 
By the end of the second round of quantitative easing, the interest rate on Baa corporate 
bond was around 350 bps lower than in November 2008. The largest reduction, 320 bps, 
took place during the first round of quantitative easing. In this period, the interest rates 
on Aaa bonds had a smaller reduction, about 140 bps which contributed to a decrease in 
the spread between the two interest rates. This result suggests that quantitative easing, 
but mostly the first round, contributed to a reduction in reduction of spreads and interest 
rates in the private credit market.  
The effects on interest rate of 30-year mortgages are less pronounced, which is 
consistent with finds in Stroebel and Taylor (2009). Nonetheless, the refinancing 
activity that followed the purchases of MBS is one of the causes behind a less 
successful decline in the interest rates of mortgages. 
In the same period, the Treasury yields had a different response to quantitative 
easing. As a response to the announcement of the purchases of MBS and agency debt, in 
November 2008, the yield on 10-year Treasury securities fell sharply compared to the 
yield on 2-year Treasuries, which indicates a decrease in term premium like Gagnon et 
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al. (2010) suggest. As the purchases started to be executed, the yields on 5-year and 10-
year Treasuries started to rise. This is consistent with the results in Cochrane (2011), 
where the purchases of private debt would counterbalance the flight to quality flows and 
would reduce the interest rates on private debt and raise the interest rates on public debt. 
(Figure 6) 
In order to forecast the changes in inflation expectations, the spread between the 
nominal treasury notes and treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS) can be used as 
a proxy. However, there are two factors influencing this measure: the inflation risk, 
which makes investors in TIPS overstate expected inflation and; the liquidity risk, 
linked to the illiquidity in TIPS market which makes it to understate expected inflation. 
(see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004)).  
The graph in Figure 7 shows that quantitative easing helped to stabilize inflation 
expectations around the FOMC mandate for inflation of 2%. First, the 5-year and 10-
year inflation expectations that had been falling since July 2008, started to rise right 
after the announcement in November 2008.  Although the inflation expectations fell, 
like the inflation rate, during the two first quarters of 2010, it was around 2% during 
2011.  
In order to discuss the impact of large-scale purchases on economic growth, I 
use the spread between 10-year and 3-month Treasury securities yields which can be 
used to forecast future economic activity (see Haubrich (2006)). Both in the last quarter 
of 2008 and in the two three quarters of 2010, the spread registered a reduction of 140 
bps. This was an indicator of deceleration of economic activity in the periods that 
anticipated the announcements of the two rounds of quantitative easing. Both rounds, 
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but mostly the first, had a significant impact on the spread which might indicate a 




I discuss the implementation and the effects of the Quantitative Easing conducted by 
the Federal Reserve System of United States between November 2008 and June 2011. 
The first round had strong positive effects on interest rates, mainly on the spread 
between the interest rates on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds and on the spread between 
the 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields which made possible the stabilization of the 
inflation expectations around the Federal Reserve mandate of 2% and the improvement 
of economic activity. In its turn, the second round had less pronounced effects on those 
variables as a result of both the kind of securities involved and the more stable credit 
markets. 
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